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"Had Mao died in 1956, his achievements would have been immortal. Had he died in 1966, he
would still have been a great man. But he died in 1976. Alas, what can one say?"1
- Chen Yun
Despite his celebrated status as a founding father, war hero, and poet, Mao Zedong is
often placed within the pantheon of totalitarian leaders, amongst the ranks of Mussolini, Stalin,
and Hitler. Mao is widely known for being at the helm one of the most murderous regimes, with
millions of deaths caused by classicide, famine, and political rivalry. One of the deadliest eras
under his reign was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in which millions were
persecuted, imprisoned, tortured, disgraced, led to suicide, maimed, and killed. During this
tumultuous decade, Mao’s personality cult reached its climax, and thousands wreaked chaos in
his name, resulting in a factionalism-fueled civil war that ravaged the nation, stunting the
nation’s economic, educational, political, and artistic growth for years. Although generally
discouraged and hindered by the powerful single-party state, Chinese historiography has been
largely defined by its interest in Mao’s legacy – namely the excesses of the Cultural Revolution
and how his personality cult shaped those events.
Although the Cultural Revolution ended over 40 years ago, the historiography of the
Cultural Revolution has been rather meager in comparison to other recent historical events.
However, since the centennial of Mao’s birth, there has been a steady stream of literature on both
Mao and the Cultural Revolution. Sinologists have found the Cultural Revolution to be an
inexhaustible topic, ripe with discussion and debate. However, in mainland China, discussing the
Cultural Revolution is still highly discouraged. Following Mao’s death, dialogue about the
Cultural Revolution became increasingly more public and readily available, especially in the
form of former Red Guard memoirs and “scar literature” (shanghen wenxue). Scar literature was
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a cathartic form of literature in which writers described the suffering and persecution of cadres
and intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution. Although Deng Xiaoping refused to outright
denounce Mao, similar to Khrushchev’s secret speech, the moderate liberalization that occurred
immediately following Mao’s death resulted in such exposés being widely published and
circulated. Beyond being cathartic, the scar literature of the “Beijing spring” of 1978-1979 was
also a means to criticize the Communist Party under the guise, and through the means, of placing
blame squarely on the Gang of Four and criticizing Mao.
Before the Cultural Revolution even occurred, prominent American journalist, Edgar
Snow, was one of the few Westerners to document the infancy of Communism in China and the
Chinese Communist Revolution. Snow and Mao developed a lifelong mutual rapport, and
Snow’s Red Star Over China, published in 1937, which chronicled the Long March and the
ensuing events, not only glorified Mao but also presented the emergence of Communism in
China for the first time to an international, notably Western, audience. Snow interviewed Mao
several times, and despite presenting a romanticized version of Communist China, in one of his
later works – The Long Revolution, published in 1972 – Snow is the first to report the nascent
personality cult.
Although the earliest works on the Cultural Revolution were written before it technically
ended, the majority of the historiography of the Cultural Revolution exploded on the scene
immediately following the centennial of Mao’s birth in 1993, and since then, there has been a
consistent outpouring of several publications a year for the past ten years. The Cultural
Revolution has been a relatively unexplored pocket for most historians, and the majority of
works are being written by the same handful of prominent sinologists. In 1974, the first volume
of The Origins of the Cultural Revolution by Roderick MacFarquhar, the leading expert on the
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Cultural Revolution,2 was published. The second and third volumes of the trilogy were published
in 1983 and 1997, respectively. In 1987, Lowell Dittmer’s China’s Continuous Revolution was
published. Prominent Swedish sinologist Michael Schoenhals’ China’s Cultural Revolution,
1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party was published a few years later in 1996. That same year,
Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution by Jiaqi Yan and Gao Gao was also
released. In 2006, Schoenhals and MacFarquhar published what is now considered the utmost
seminal work of the Cultural Revolution – Mao’s Last Revolution. The Chinese Cultural
Revolution: A History by New Zealander sinologist Paul Clark was published and Mobo C.F.
Gao’s treatise, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution, were both
published in 2008. In 2011, The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction by Richard Kurt
Craus and Heaven Cracks, Earth Shakes: The Tangshan Earthquake and the Death of Mao’s
China by James Palmer were published. Other prominent sinologists include Jonathan Spence,
Jonathan Unger, Lucian Pye, Richard Baum, and Maurice Meisner.
The majority of the aforementioned histories on the Cultural Revolution have been
largely concerned with detailing the “history” of the events, which, to this day, are largely
shrouded in official secrecy by the Chinese Communist Party. However, besides being concerned
with dates, facts, and events, the historiography of both Mao and the Cultural Revolution has
also been largely influenced by other interdisciplinary texts, such as biographies, memoirs, and
art theory pieces. Published in 1999, Mao: A Life by Philip Short chronicles Mao’s ascension to
prominence and how this former peasant became the revolutionary Communist leader and
“secular deity” he is today. In the same year, Mao: A Biography by Ross Terrill was published.
While Short was more concerned with Mao’s ideological standpoint, Terrill is interested in
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examining Mao’s less savory habits, such as promiscuity, and how the myth and humanity of
Mao were largely irreconcilable and yet beneficial to his legendary status. Lee Feigon’s largely
sympathetic work, Mao: A Reinterpretation was published in 2002. The most prominent of these
biographies has been Jung Chang and John Halliday’s scathing biography, Mao: The Unknown
Story. The vehemently anti-Mao work, which names Mao as the greatest mass murderer in
human history, was published in 2005.
Until the beginning of the twenty-first century, the majority of the scholarship on the
Cultural Revolution has been overwhelmingly focused on the “facts:” What was the Cultural
Revolution? How did it come about? Who is to blame? How many victims were there? Unlike
other historical topics, the historiography of Mao has not been in line with contemporaneous
historiographical trends, nor have the historiographical lens progressed in a linear fashion.
Within the narrow frame of historiography, many works on the Cultural Revolution have failed
to go beyond the “great men” historiographical approach and have focused much of their
attention on Mao and his actions. The discourse of the Cultural Revolution has been largely
centered around Mao’s culpability – namely that Mao was in fact culpable and that he
purposefully cultivated is own personality cult. However, recent literature has been less critical
of Mao and acknowledges that Mao was but one piece of the puzzle – after all, it was Liu Shaoqi
who is considered the main architect of the personality cult, who ordered the publication of the
revered Little Red Book, and who elevated and deified Mao to the party cadres as a means to
secure his own political legitimacy.
A very recent trend in the Mao historiography has been going beyond trying to articulate
what the Cultural Revolution was and trying to examine the everyday experiences of the ordinary
people who were involved. This scholarship has utilized the “bottom-up” perspective of social
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history, granting greater agency to Mao’s followers. This shift is visible within works such as
The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis by Wu Yiching (2014) and
The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History by Frank Dikötter (2016). In The Cultural
Revolution at the Margins, Wu analyzes how the movement was originally orchestrated from
above, but quickly evolved into a grassroots movement, and would ultimately leave the most
faithful of Mao’s followers cynical and disillusioned. In A People’s History, utilizing previously
classified party documents, such as secret police reports, and in-depth interviews, Dikötter gives
a voice to the voiceless and unearths how ordinary people “buried Maoism,” thus undermining
the pervasive image of conformity that is often taken for granted and unequestioned in most of
the scholarship on the Cultural Revolution. In a similar vein, recent scholarship has also been
interested in analyzing more localized stories instead of grand sweeping, all-encompassing
histories. In 2017, The Killing Wind: A Chinese County’s Descent into Madness During the
Cultural Revolution was published. The work by Hecheng Tan examined what is now known as
the Daoxian massacre – the mass killings of more than 4,000 “class enemies,” including children
and the elderly, over the course of 66 days in 1967. Rather than attempt to present a singular
truth on what the Cultural Revolution was or what it represents, these more localized works can
uncover the multiplicity of realities that occurred.
While the historiography of the Cultural Revolution has been largely concerned with
facts and dates, the historiography of the personality cult of Mao has been mostly framed within
similar personality cults of other totalitarian leaders. An exemplary work in this vein is Paul
Hollander’s From Benito Mussolini to Hugo Chavez: Intellectuals and a Century of Political
Hero Worship, published in 2016. Although Western historiography places Mao within the ranks
of other dictators, Chinese historians are more inclined to place Mao within the cultural context
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of Chinese leaders. For example, while Hollander aligns Mao’s cult with those of other leaders,
Xuezhi Guo positions Mao and his cult amongst a lineage of other Chinese political leaders in
The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective, published in 2002. A
similar work is When Heroes Pass Away: The Invention of a Chinese Communist Pantheon by
Dachang Cong, published in 1997.
Beyond social history, there has also been a rather substantial amount of scholarship
regarding both the propagandistic art of the period, and contemporary artistic production that is
both influenced and critical of art from the Cultural Revolution. Published in 2012, Barbara
Mittler’s A Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture is similar to
other predecessors who discuss both the art of the Cultural Revolution and how its influences can
still be found in modern-day China. In August 1968, Mao gifted a crate of mangoes he had
received from the Pakistani foreign minister to factory workers who had helped quell the
factional violence between Red Guards at Qinhua University, thus marking the transition of
Mao’s faith in the Red Guards to the proletariat. Named after the eponymous exhibition at the
Museum Rietberg in Zürich, Mao’s Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution by Alfreda
Murck (2013) traces the history of this momentous event, the spontaneous “mango cult” that
blossomed shortly afterwards, and how its legacy has resonated in subsequent artworks. Other
works interested in the propaganda artwork of the period include: Cultural Revolution Posters
and Memorabilia by James and Victoria Edison (2005); Chairman Mao Badges: Symbols and
Slogans of the Cultural Revolution by Helen Wang (2008) – based on the titular exhibit at the
British Museum; Art in Turmoil: the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976 edited by Richard
Kang (2010); and Museum Representations of Maoist China: From Cultural Revolution to
Commie Kitsch by Amy Jane Barnes (2014).
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Within China, the scholarship and public discourse on the Cultural Revolution has been
largely constrained by the marked silence of the Chinese Communist Party. Following Deng
Xiaoping’s death in 1997, there was a period of liberalization and relaxation. However, what is
most difficult about covering the Cultural Revolution, or any event since the beginning of the
reign of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, is that the party is still very much in power. As
such, what is released, discussed, and debated is at the mercy of official party rhetoric. Even in
2018, half a century after the outbreak of the Revolution, an official state-endorsed school
textbook has been accused of heavily censoring text on the Cultural Revolution, as well as
omitting key elements, and condensing the already short text.3 There has been notable silence on
the issue – the Communist Party has been notably reluctant to open any discussion concerning
the Cultural Revolution, and the victims have never been allowed to mourn considering many
cemeteries which hold the victims of the Cultural Revolution are considered off-limits and are
protected by surveillance cameras and barbed wire.4
What appears to be happening is a blatant contradiction – Mao’s popularity is evident in
every media of art, Cultural Revolution-themed restaurants5 proliferate, and every market stall
hawks commodities and relics from the period, and yet the public discourse is relatively mum on
the topic, the party frowns upon discussing the events, and commemoration is largely
nonexistent. In 2011, the 90th anniversary of the Communist party ushered in a new resurgence

3

Mandy Zuo, “Controversy over Chinese textbook’s Cultural Revolution chapter as state publisher denies
censorship,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), January 11, 2018,
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Maldonado 10
of “Red Culture,”6 further inspiring works on the tumultuous period. Despite its initial rocky
release of Feng Xiaogang’s film, Youth, a love-story set to the backdrop of the turbulent era, was
the top-grossing film in China when it was released two months after its initial release date,
amassing $44.4 million its opening weekend.7 Red Guard memoirs are still tremendously
popular, and with the Internet they have become even more accessible to the general public.
Within the past few years, former Red Guards have chronicled their experiences through blogs,8
issued public (potentially state-orchestrated) apologies to their victims,9 and become popular
school-assigned books in the states, likened to The Diary of Anne Frank and I Am Malala.10
Overall, the Cultural Revolution is largely ignored, or at least not openly spoken about, in
China, representing a mass form of public amnesia. Whether this is due to lack of interest, or due
to stringent censorship, remains to be seen. As such, within China, “the domestic story remains
tightly controlled, and in any realm the unofficial history of the PRC cannot yet be written.”11
However, the relatively scant historiography in the West is not due to lack of interest, but more
so an effect of the “archive gap.” Beyond the sanctioned study of “Party history” (dang shi),12
access to documents from the Cultural Revolution are largely unavailable for obvious reasons.

6

Louisa Lim, “Chinese Reopen Debate Over Chairman Mao’s Legacy,” National Public Radio, June 22, 2011,
https://www.npr.org/2011/06/22/137231508/chinese-reopen-debate-over-chairman-maos-legacy.
7
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8
Tom Philips, “Fifty years on, one of Mao’s ‘little generals’ exposes horror of the Cultural Revolution,” Guardian,
May 7, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/07/mao-little-general-horror-cultural-revolution.
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Anthony Kuhn, “Chinese Red Guards Apologize, Reopening a Dark Chapter,” National Public Radio, February 4,
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Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar, eds. Francis X. Blouin Jr. and William G.
Rosenberg (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 440.
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In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party passed the resolution, “On some questions
regarding the history of the Party since the founding of the PRC,” which famously declared
Chairman Mao as “70 percent right and 30 percent wrong.” In this same resolution, the Party
declared that the Cultural Revolution was “responsible for the most severe setback and the
heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the
People’s Republic.” This disavowal maintained Mao’s legacy and left the culpability of the
violence in those who could no longer defend themselves – Mao and the Gang of Four – while
simultaneously absolving the following administrations and legitimating their history. After all,
if the Party completely disavowed Mao, it would naturally follow that the Party itself would
come under scrutiny. Six years later, in an effort to present at least a semblance of transparency,
the CCP attempted to make historical archives more accessible. After the passage of the Archive
Law of 1987, it was decreed that diplomatic and other archives are to become open after 30
years. However, despite the lessening of restrictions on Chinese archives, the majority of
archives are largely unavailable to historians. There are notable exemptions of act that, in effect,
render the law useless and ineffectual for anyone besides official historiographers. These
exemptions include: matters of state, public security, national defense, and foreign relations, not
to mention, in the case of foreign scholars, matters unsuitable for foreigners.13 These exemptions
obviously present giant loopholes in which Chinese officials can argue that pretty much any
archival material that doesn’t coincide or corroborate the official party line is off-limits. The
available archives were purposely curated to expose only what was permissible and would serve
the party – while the party has openly encouraged historical materials on Japanese atrocities in

13
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China, “the massacres of Chinese, by Chinese, during the history of Chinese Communism and of
the People’s Republic,” have been carefully omitted.14
With all the obstacles, perhaps the secrecy and censorship surrounding the Cultural
Revolution has been an enticing provocation for sinologists rather than a deterrent. This paper
will trace the efforts of these persistent sinologists within the historiography of the personality
cult of Mao, and in particular, its intensification during the Cultural Revolution. I will be tracing
historiographical trends within and between the following works: Revolutionary Immortality:
Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution by Jay Lifton (1968); Children of Mao:
Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation by Anita Chan
(1985); Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader by Geremie Barmé (1996),
Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Consumption of a Personality Cult by
Melissa Schrift (2001); Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual by Daniel Leese (2011); and The Art of
Cloning: Creative Production During China’s Cultural Revolution by Pang Laikwan (2017).
Each title has been published approximately eight years after the prior one. These works cover a
span of nearly fifty years and encompass a wide variety of historiographical lenses, ranging from
psycho history to political history to cultural history.
Boasting the status of being the world’s most populous nation, and closely following the
United States with the world’s second-largest economy, the People’s Republic of China is
simultaneously revered for being one of the world’s earliest civilizations and for being one of the
most rapidly-advancing nations, leading the way in infrastructure, ecommerce, and renewable
energy initiatives. Between thousands of years of rich history and its status as a burgeoning
global power, Chinese culture and society is defined by both its past and future. After thousands

14
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of years of dynastic rule, the Republic of China was founded in 1912 following the Xinhai
Revolution. Political and ideological strife between the ruling Nationalist Party of China, or the
Kuomintang, and the Communist Party of China fueled the Chinese Civil War that lasted from
1927 to 1949. Briefly interrupted by a momentary truce during the Second Sino-Japanese War in
1937-1945, the Chinese Civil War ended with the Chinese Communist Party seizing control of
mainland China and the Kuomintang retreating to Taiwan. The communist revolutionary, Mao
Zedong, proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic in China on October 1, 1949.
Formerly the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, Mao became a dominant figure and de facto
leader of the Communist Party. The founding father of the PRC, Mao served as the Party
Chairman until his death in 1976.
Initially popular with the peasantry through a violent system of land reform in which
thousands of landlords were killed, Mao attempted to solidify his popular support during the
Great Leap Forward. The disastrous economic campaign aimed to rapidly transform the largely
agrarian and rural nation into a socialist society through collectivization and industrialization at
break-neck speeds. The campaign resulted in the deadliest famine recorded with an estimated 30
million deaths. After the catastrophe of the ill-fated reform movement, which killed millions of
and disillusioned those who suffered and survived, Mao and the CCP ushered in the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution as a means to strengthen what appeared to be the weakening of
Mao’s grip on his people and his influence within the party. Although widely disputed, with a
range from the minimum of 400,000 casualties upwards of several millions, countless lives were
destroyed, with widespread torture, “struggle sessions,” imprisonment, public humiliation,
murder, and even instances of cannibalism.15 The period of intense political upheaval affected

15
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every aspect of Chinese society – schools and universities were shut down for students to
criticize teachers, spouses reported each other, children spied on their parents, and the state
halted many of its functions until 1969.
One of the earliest works on Mao’s culpability and the Cultural Revolution was published
only two years into the decade of chaos in 1968. Dr. Robert Jay Lifton’s Revolutionary
Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution is one of the, if not the, earliest works
that analyzed Mao’s role in the revolution, as well as his personality cult.16 Lifton’s work differs
from later scholarship in a very significant manner – Mao was still alive while his work was
written. While later scholarship had the benefit of viewing at the events in retrospect, Lifton
wrote Revolutionary Immortality at the height of the revolution. This is significant considering
the lack of information available to Western historians, much less anyone outside of China at the
time, on the events of the revolution. Also, Lifton is one of the only historians, or perhaps the
only historian, who has approached the topic through the controversial lens of psychohistory.
Despite Lifton’s unique psychohistorical perspective, he falls within the trap early historians of
the Cultural Revolution found themselves in by being solely interested in finding Mao’s
culpability for the Cultural Revolution, ignoring the spontaneous, popular nature of the
movement.
Revolutionary Immortality utilizes a psychohistorical framework to construct a proposed
analysis on what exactly happened during the Cultural Revolution and how it came to be, mainly
focused within the bloody first two years of the period. Lifton attempts to address how the period
of violence was even possible. Refuting those who put forth a simple explanation of “power
struggle,” Lifton contends that the Cultural Revolution was not a power struggle between
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opposing factions, but rather a struggle for “power over death.”17 Even in recent scholarship, the
causes of the Cultural Revolution have been largely ascribed to Mao’s desire to purge
untrustworthy cadres, or those who opposed them.
A violent and cathartic “human experiment,” Lifton views the revolution as a symbolic
grasp for immortality. Written while Mao was still alive, Lifton views the revolution as a dying,
or at least aging and/or ill, heroic figure’s attempt to preserve the fervent passion of Communist
China against a symbolic death. This desire to construct something that will live beyond oneself
is a universal theme in human history for Lifton. Mao’s ardent call, or at least condoning, of
violence during the Cultural Revolution is interpreted by Lifton as representative of Mao’s fears
that the revolution and the party would take the “capitalist road” after his death; a “symbolic
death,” not physical death. While Mao had previously been motivated, and sensitively affected
by deaths, including those of his siblings and the execution of his first wife and comrades under
the Kuomintang, Lifton explains Mao’s “loss of confidence in his claim to immortality,”
marking his transition from great leader to despot in an attempt to repeatedly enact the deaths of
his enemies to perpetually become an “eternal survivor.”18
Lifton utilizes a variety of sources, including endless quotations from Mao; Mao’s
written works, including essays and poems; and interviews with the Chairman. Notably, Lifton
does not engage with other historians on this topic, but this makes sense considering Lifton was
one of the first historians to write on the subject, considering his work was first published
immediately following the violent excesses of the revolution, which some would contend
extended until the book was re-published in 1976. Known as the foremost psychohistorian, or as
he prefers, “a historically minded psychiatrist,” Lifton has frequently examined the

17
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psychological causes and effects of wars and political violence and the concept of thought reform
throughout his works. The psychohistorical lens Lifton utilizes is carefully used as merely a
framework, rather than an attempt to singlehandedly assign a cause/culprit to the Cultural
Revolution. Lifton does appear to speak in conversation with other psychiatrists and
psychologists, for instance, drawing upon Erik H. Erikson’s concept of ego psychology, and
visibly makes use of his formal psychiatric education and experience.
Although psychohistory has often been criticized as mere speculation due to lack of
evidence,19 Lifton preemptively refutes these claims by noting that he has actively avoided the
frequent error in psychohistory of “viewing large historical events as nothing but manifestations
of someone’s individual psychopathology.”20 Lifton utilizes his psychohistorical framework to
suggest that the Cultural Revolution “can be understood as a quest for revolutionary
immortality.”21 Lifton does not attempt to pathologize or diagnose Mao, but merely attempts to
understand him and the role the man, his legend, his Thought, and his cult, took part in for the
“historical discontinuity” of the Cultural Revolution. The revolution is regarded as ultimately
being cannibalistic and self-destructive in nature to the power and longevity of the Chinese
Communist Party, which, of course, has since been proven incorrect.
In 1985, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red
Guards Generation by Anita Chan was published. As its title suggests, Chan takes an intimate
look into the personality cult by examining several case studies of some of Mao’s most devoted
youthful followers.22 Chan characterizes the personality cult, namely the widespread and fervent
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participation of Chinese youth, as a product of the concept of the “authoritarian personality,” as
conceptualized by the Frankfurt School. This personality is namely a product of the “political
socialization” found in the formal education system in China. Chan derives her assertion through
a series of interviews with former Red Guards who were teenagers during the Cultural
Revolution, conducted in Hong Kong between 1974 and 1976. Chan herself is a Hong Kong
native and found herself fascinated with her friends’ tales of their former exploits, and how
passionate the former Red Guards once were, and how disillusioned they had become. While
Chan interviewed fourteen former Red Guards, Children of Mao focuses on four specific case
studies. Although these former Red Guards all came from a bourgeois background, and were all
active Red Guards in one manner or another, they all had different experiences. Through these
four case studies, Chan outlines four principle types of activists: the conforming activist (who
was, coincidentally, the only female of the group); the purist activist; the rebellious activist; and
the pragmatic activist. 23
Although the title would suggest the focus would be on the decade of the Cultural
Revolution, Chan’s study begins in the 1950s and concludes post-revolution. Chan begins by
chronicling the group’s primary school experience, in which character formation and political
education were considered paramount. As the children entered adolescence, the demands of
political socialization became increasingly demanding, and their education shaped the behavior
of the students through peer pressures and a strictly controlled social environment. The students
expressed their loyalty in differing manners, resulting in the different categories of activists.
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Although education and upbringing had once been largely familial, by the 1950’s, the authority
of the family was superseded by the authority of the state and school-learned socialization.
Children of Mao is an outlier amongst the early scholarship of the Cultural Revolution,
and is more concerned with how Red Guards became so zealous and agitated during the
tumultuous period, rather than immediately pointing blame at Mao. Chan asserts that the Chinese
youth were indoctrinated by a carefully curated and centralized state education, rather than
placing blame on the families. This assertion is noteworthy considering the fact that much of the
previous scholarship viewed the Cultural Revolution as a “specifically Chinese” phenomenon.
However, Chan aligns with later scholarship which argues that this feverish personality cult can
be found in any society, not just China, and not even just in totalitarian nations.
The “authoritarian personality” is defined as someone who ‘admires authority and tends
to submit to it, but at the same time… wants to be an authority himself and have others submit to
him.’24 Erich Fromm, a prominent member of the Frankfurt School, found that the authoritarian
personality could be found in both Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. While the concept of the
authoritarian personality was originally conceived by Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno, also
amongst the humanist Marxist Frankfurt School of philosophers, refuted Fromm’s earlier
assertions, and argued that the authoritarian personality was a “latent character structure” that
could be found anywhere, “not only in countries experiencing authoritarian convulsions.”25 On
the other side of the spectrum, political scientist and sinologist Lucian Pye, and former
ambassador, Richard Solomon, argued that such authoritarian personality characteristics were
commonly found in China due to the traditionally authoritarian family structure, as well as
Chinese culture. However, Chan directly refutes this contention, instead arguing that it is the
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school and not the family who mainly socializes Chinese children.26 Overall, Chan uses the four
case studies of former Red Guards to demonstrate the political socialization of Chinese youth,
which was enacted by the centralized state education, not the family. Chan also refutes
Orientalist perspectives, and argues that the authoritarian personality was neither an inherently
Chinese quality, nor is it only found in authoritarian states.
Published in 1996, Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader chronicled
the resurgence of Mao’s popularity in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.27 This resurgence of
popularity, known as Maore, or “Mao craze,” was largely influenced by the impending centenary
of Mao’s birthday in 1993. Influenced by his experiences as an exchange student at Fudan
University in Shanghai during the last few years of the Cultural Revolution, including several
direct experiences with “criticism sessions,” Barmé traces the ironic revival of interest in Mao
during the late 1980s and early 1990s in China. Particularly popular with the youth who had
never lived under Mao, the unique “MaoCraze” of this period was marketed in distinctly
capitalist ways – ranging from trendy, Cultural Revolution-themed restaurants where
cosmopolitan diners would “eat Mao,” to cheaply mass-produced Mao badges, reminiscent of the
original “object of passionate devotion during the Cultural Revolution.” Despite “the vacuum
created by officially-enforced silence,” all throughout the country, propagandists, commentators,
and academics, were now passionately reaffirming, condemning, or questioning Mao’s legacy,
with a surprising frankness not found, or perhaps possible, during Mao’s heyday. Unlike the
personality cult of the Cultural Revolution, this newfound obsession with the late Great Leader
was devoid entirely of its original class, ethical, and political dimensions. Despite Deng
Xiaoping’s extended repudiation of both Mao’s legacy and the Cultural Revolution, Deng lived
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to witness not only the decline of his own popularity, but also the resurgence of the legend of the
man he tried so fervently to disavow and erase from China’s past. Barmé analyzes this revival
through a rich and diverse collection of news articles, memoirs, poetry, fiction, and Communist
Party documents.
Barmé traces the evolution of the original personality cult to its revival in the 1990’s
through memoirs, poetry, fiction, and Communist Party documents. In this anthology of
translations, Barmé is attempting to demonstrate the contradictory attitudes of ordinary people
towards Mao in the posthumous cult, thus attempting to grant agency similar to later historians.
Barmé also offers valuable insights to the scholarship on the Mao cult, continuing the history
from the end of the Cultural Revolution to present day. Barmé found that the resurgence of
popularity within those who lived through the Cultural Revolution was largely representative of
both the deep dissatisfaction of the status quo and a nostalgia for the power and leadership of
Mao. For youth, however, Mao represented a “homebred luminary,”28 a powerful symbol of
China that took on new youthful forms outside of the carefully curated persona that had been
devised by the CCP in earlier years.
Published in 2001, Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and
Consumption of a Personality Cult details the “biography” of the heavily commodified, envied,
and potentially subversive Chairman Mao Badges that proliferated during the Cultural
Revolution.29 Melissa Schrift traces the history of Mao badges, from the crude, rudimentary ones
created by students in the 1930s, to the increasingly complex and ornate ones fought over at the
height of their popularity during the Cultural Revolution, to the precious but few sought-after

28

Barmé, Shades of Mao, 47.
Melissa Schrift, Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality
Cult (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001).
29

Maldonado 21
badges that proliferate now in Chinese markets catered to Westerners and badge collectors.
Schrift categorizes the badges chronologically – Yenan badges, during the Yenan period of the
Chinese Communist Party; postliberation badges, following the establishment of the People’s
Republic in 1949; and Cultural Revolution badges, from the early period of the Cultural
Revolution. Although Schrift also delineates the Cultural Revolution as occurring from 1966 to
1976, the “Cultural Revolution” period of the badges ends at 1969, following the excesses and
violence of the early period when the badges began to be recalled and melted down by the
government. The badges would later be recalled again following Mao’s death in 1976.
Although Schrift’s main focus is during the height of the Cultural Revolution, she traces
the badges and the personality cult to contemporary China. Published at the turn of the
millennium, Schrift is influenced by her firsthand experiences of Mao’s “iconic reemergence in
contemporary China following the Maore (Mao craze) in the early 1990s,”30 which marked the
centenary of Mao’s birthday. Influenced by her personal experiences in China in which she
witnessed first-hand the resurrection, or at least the resurfacing, of the personality cult, albeit in a
much more openly satirical and “tongue-in-cheek” manner, Schrift details the myriad ways
Mao’s image has been repurposed and represented – from sacrilegious pop art, to wildly popular
Cultural Revolution-themed restaurants.
Schrift draws upon a wide variety of sources, notably numerous anecdotes from those
who lived during the Cultural Revolution, including former Red Guards. These anecdotes are
utilized to gain an understanding of the variegated nature of the personality cult and how people
maneuvered these relationships. Asserting that there exists a “dialectical relationship between
centralized propaganda and public consumption,” Schrift “examines the scope of propaganda
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strategies and the people’s ability to mediate national forces through the consumption of Mao
badges.” Schrift maintains that “Mao badges provided a way for people to define themselves and
to internalize and negotiate a dogmatic nationalist ideology during the Cultural Revolution.”
Mao badges were initially intended to symbolize the people’s devotion to and support of Mao
Zedong. However, despite their original intentions, Mao badges, and how they were worn and
perceived, took on a life of their own and expanded into other arenas of meaning.31 Both the
nature of her sources, and her ability to cast doubt upon the homogeneity of the personality cult
that so many other scholars insist upon, Schrift demonstrates attention to the agency and
autonomy of Chinese citizens otherwise unseen in other scholarship. Schrift grants agency to
those who wore these badges, and participated in the Cultural Revolution, not as crazed
personality cult members, but as historical actors who worked within, often confining,
boundaries of acceptable political behavior and display. This analysis demonstrates Schrift’s
antithesis to the rigid distinctions between official and popular culture, which she instead views
as symbolic exchange.32
Influenced by her anthropological background, Schrift’s first work, Biography of a
Chairman Mao Badge, could be well defined as cultural history. If “cultural history attends to
meaning and representation,”33 Schrift’s historiographical inclination is evident through the
analysis and history of the Mao badges, and not only what they represent in their iconography,
but also what they represented to both the wearers and the, often envious, spectators. Beyond
representation, Schrift’s work is representative of cultural historians’ interest in the sheer nature
of the type of object she analyzes. Schrift attempts to fill the void in discussion of propaganda
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medium during the Cultural Revolution, noting the baffling absence and omission of Mao badge
analysis in Western scholarship. Although Schrift notes two Chinese scholars, Li Xuemi and
Zhou Jihou, whose work have been tremendously influential in her research, she clarifies that
“both [texts] are primarily descriptive, without any lengthy critical analyses of the political
implications of badges… and [are] often couched in praise of the Communist regime,” which
“reflect the difficulties of doing work on Mao propaganda in China.”34 Despite the obvious
limitations presented to Li and Zhou, Schrift is unfettered by fears of censorship, and is able to
expound the significance of these badges in both Cultural Revolution propaganda and Chinese
material culture. Cultural history “coincided with the rediscovery of sites and objects which have
considerably enlarged the repertoire of historical documents,”35 and Mao badges are now
amongst the “many objects previously considered as mere curiosities or unimportant souvenirs
[which] became the subject of historical research.”36
Exploring the iconography, or “the reading of art in relation to the intellectual world in
which it was commissioned and created,”37 of the badges, Schrift also connotes the significant art
history influence upon cultural history. This influence upon cultural history is also evident in
Schrift’s analysis of the badges as a propaganda medium; cultural historians have also been
interested in examining “art in the service of the state or its opponents.”38 Also telling of
Schrift’s historiographical inclination is her interest in contemporary museums, whether official
or ad hoc, which display precious collections of Mao badges. “The museum reinforces the trend
towards according a new importance to objects, the organization of which in space creates its
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own narrative,”39 and Schrift examines how the desire to place Mao badges in museums is an
attempt to professionalize and standardize badge collecting, as well as celebrate it.
Daniel Leese asserts Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution as the
first work to “scrutinize the cult of Mao and the massive worship that was fostered around him at
the height of his powers during the Cultural Revolution.”40 Published in 2013, Mao Cult
distances itself from other scholarship by “analyzing previously secret archival documents,
obscure objects, and political pamphlets.” Despite Leese’s access to formerly unavailable
resources, Leese presents the same, rehashed opinion found in most Western scholarship – Mao
was to blame for the emergence of the personality cult, and thus for the factionalism-fueled
violence of the Cultural Revolution. The problem with this assertion is clear – it raises Mao as
some omnipotent and impenetrable being, absolves other party members of any culpability, and
largely erases the autonomy and agency of those who participated in the chaos. Although Leese
may assert that his argument deviates from other scholarship, really Leese is only confirming and
falling within the acceptable boundaries of official party rhetoric.
Unlike the other scholarship, Leese utilizes a transnational approach and likens Mao’s
personality cult to those of other totalitarian leaders, pointing to Fromm’s scholarship that Chan
was attempting to refute back in 1985. While Leese is overwhelmingly concentrated on Mao and
his personality cult, the closest Leese ever approaches to considering autonomy within the
Cultural Revolution is dubbing the ensuing chaos as “cult anarchy.”41
Perhaps the most fruitful analysis of the Cultural Revolution, Pang Laikwan’s The Art of
Cloning: Creative Production During China (2017) is one of the few works to take a more
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realistic stance falling somewhere in the middle between the agency of the Mao cult and Mao’s
power and grip over the party and his followers.42 According to Pang, the Cultural Revolution
was not simply “pure top-down control, but an alternative model of cultural economy, enabling
people to engage in the political participation through the production and consumption of the
artwork.”43 In this statement we see the progression of autonomy outlined in earlier works.
Although largely concerned with artwork and cultural production, it is clear that Pang’s narrative
of autonomy is largely different than the majority of scholarship which is overwhelmingly
focused on Mao.
The Art of Cloning is most similar to Melissa Schrift’s Biography of a Chairman Mao
Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality Cult. Despite being published
nearly two decades before Laikwan, Schrift was one of the few scholars taking interest in the
autonomy of Red Guards and Mao cult followers during the Revolution. Perhaps what is most
interesting about the two works is their shared focus – Laikwan views the Cultural Revolution
through the myriad of different art works that proliferated during the period despite the official
condemnation against such bourgeois interests, and how artistic endeavors were a means to
exercise some degree, albeit limited, of agency in an aggressively conformist society. In a similar
vein, Schrift’s focus is on the endless varieties of badges that were created during the revolution
and how their adornment represented different meanings for different people in different
contexts, often as a means to outwardly proclaim loyalty and devotion to Chairman Mao without
having to resort to other displays or rituals.
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Pang utilizes a tremendous variety of sources, including author-conducted interviews of
those who lived and participated in the Cultural Revolution. While Chan focused her attention on
former Red Guards, Pang is interested in those who created and produced propagandistic artwork
during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Pang also employs Chinese newspaper articles,
biographies, first-person accounts, and the art and propaganda itself. Pang draws upon a wide
array of scholarship, from classic sinologists, such as MacFarquhar, Schoenhals, and Maurice
Meisner, to sinologists with more localized interests, such as Emily Honig, who was interested in
the role of women during Cultural Revolution. Pang draws upon very recent scholarship,
including both Mao Cult by Leese, and The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese
Socialism in Crisis by Yiching Wu. Pang also utilizes a work similar to her own – Barbara
Mittler’s Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture, which examines
the popularity and contining legacy of artwork created during the Cultural Revolution. Other
diverse sources include primary documents by Jiang Qing, Mao, and Zhou Enlai, as well as
Althusser, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
Half a century later, China still lives within the shadow of the Cultural Revolution and
Chairman Mao. Even with the Maore of the 1990’s, and the resurgence of “Red Culture” in
2011, there is still a palpable silence regarding China’s recent violent history. The founding
father of the People’s Republic of China is perhaps still just as ardently venerated as he is
abhorred. Even Xi Jinping, the current president of the People’s Republic of China, has been
unable to evade comparisons to the former leader. Of all of Mao Zedong’s accomplishments and
failures, perhaps the most well-known aspect of Chairman Mao’s legacy is the Cultural
Revolution. But as the decade fades from public memory, many of those who lived during the
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Cultural Revolution are passing away and there exists a larger chasm between them and youth
who are disconnected and uninformed on the tumultuous period.
In a field dominated by Western scholars, often through a narrow, simplistic, and
Orientalist lens, the personality cult has been left largely unexplored by Chinese historians in the
mainland. Mao’s legacy remains as compelling and as divisive as ever, despite, if not fueled by,
state-sanctioned censorship, secrecy, and silence. Despite the many obstacles being presented,
there doesn’t seem to be any indication that Western fascination with the Cultural Revolution
will end any time soon. Hopefully, perhaps in the near future, there will be greater autonomy to
publicly discuss and analyze the Cultural Revolution within China. Although openly discussing
Mao and subverting his legacy is a critical first step, it is not the only nor most significant action
that needs to be taken. This theoretical scholarship has the capacity to both heal the decades of
painful silence but also grant a voice to those of the past who persecuted and were persecuted.
With conversation, analysis, and transparency, the historiography of the Cultural Revolution can
undermine the non-truths of conformity and compliance and reveal how ordinary people
maneuvered within the period of cruelty and repression.
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Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung:

Designer: Shanghai Fine Arts Academy Work Propaganda Team, Revolutionary Committee collective work (
,
)
1970, October
Long live chairman Mao! Long, long live!
Mao zhuxi wansui! Wanwansui! (
!
!)
Publisher: Shanghai renmin chubanshe (
)
Size: 53x77 cm.
Call number: BG E13/701 (Landsberger collection)
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-701.php

Originally published in 1964, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, popularly known as the
“Little Red Book” due to its appearance, was widely distributed during the Cultural Revolution.
The original publication consisted of 200 quotations covering 23 topics, such as “Women” and
“Communists,” compiled by the PLA Daily, but was later revised to include an endorsement by
Mao’s appointed successor at the time, Lin Biao. The finalized edition would ultimately include
33 topics and 427 quotations. By the time the CCP ceased publication in February 1979, at least
one billion copies had been printed. In this propaganda poster, a group of people are at
Tiananmen Square in Beijing waving “Little Red Books” during what appears to be a rally lead
by Chairman Mao. The group at the forefront of the poster consists of young men and a woman
in People’s Liberation Army uniforms and a young peasant woman in the front; notice the
Chairman Mao badge on the shirt of the young woman to the right of the image.
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Chairman Mao Badge:

British Museum
Circular badge (57mm)
Obv: Profile of Mao in silver (head and collar) on red sunray background.
Inscription in gold below.
Rev: Hollowed out form of Mao’s head and collar.
Inscription (obv):
(Jingzhu Mao zhuxi wan shou wu jiang) Respectfully Wishing Chairman
Mao an eternal life Inscription (rev):
(Mao zhuxi wansui) Long live Chairman Mao
Note: The inscription on the reverse is in Lin Biao’s calligraphy. CM 1990,0204.17

Although the first rudimentary Chairman Mao badges were created in the 1930’s, and helped
foster the Mao Cult in the 1940’s, their popularity soared to epic proportions during the Cultural
Revolution. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, badges were feverishly traded, gifted, sold
on the black market, and even stolen. An estimated 3 billion badges were produced. At the end of
the revolution, badges were officially ordered to be turned in to be melted or destroyed, but many
hid their most precious badges, and to this day, there are collectors who boast tens or even
hundreds of thousands of badges in their collection. Although the badges usually featured Mao’s
profile (purposely to the left), rarer ones also depicted landscapes, revolutionary leaders, and
other communist leaders. Together with the Little Red Book, badges (worn on the left breast)
were the most visible way to display loyalty. The highly-coveted badges were primarily
distributed to workers, soldiers, and students, so badges could often be traded for services and
other goods, as they were expressly forbidden to be bought or sold.
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Chairman Mao swims across the Yangzi:

Designer unknown (
)
1969, July
Closely follow the great leader Chairman Mao and forge ahead courageously amid great storms and waves Celebrate the Shanghai movement to swim the Yangzi river to commemorate the third anniversary of Chairman
Mao's good swim in the Yangzi river on July the sixteenth.
Jingen weida lingxiu Mao zhuxi zai dafeng dalang zhong fenyong qianjin - Qingzhu Mao zhuxi 7.16 changyou
Changjiang san zhounian Shanghaishi changyou Changjiang huodong (
7 16
)
Publisher: Shanghai 1969 Swim the Yangzi River headquarters (
)
Size: 77x53 cm.
Call number: BG E15/289 (Landsberger collection)
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-289.php

In 1956, Chairman Mao, a lifelong ardent advocate of the benefits of swimming, swam across
the Yangzi River for the first time. On July 16, 1966, an event was organized in Wuhan to
commemorate the event. Mao joined the throngs of people swimming, exchanging jokes and
pleasantries. The swim, widely covered by the media, demonstrated that Mao was still physically
fit, contrary to rumors suggesting otherwise, and was still able to lead the revolution. This
demonstration was beneficial in Mao’s struggle to regain power during the Cultural Revolution.
Mao’s swim became a major annual event in which thousands of eager swimmers would swim in
the sea, and rivers and lakes across the country emulating Chairman Mao’s impressive swim.
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Bombard the Headquarters:

50

1962

1964

“ ”
Translation: China's first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster and Commentator's article on it in
People's Daily are indeed superbly written! Comrades, please read them again. But in the last
fifty days or so some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have acted in a
diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have
enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural
revolution of the proletariat. They have stood facts on their head and juggled black and white,
encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from their own, imposed a
white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves. They have puffed up the arrogance of the
bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the proletariat. How poisonous! Viewed in connection
with the Right deviation in 1962 and the wrong tendency of 1964 which was 'Left' in form but
Right in essence, shouldn't this make one wide awake?
“Bombard the Headquarters – My Big Character poster” was a short document written by Mao
Zedong on August 5, 1966 and publishedin the Communist Party’s official newspaper, People’s
Daily, a year later on August 5, 1967. The poster is believed to have been directly targeting and
criticizing President Liu Shaoqi and senior leader Deng Xiaoping, notably for attempting to
contain the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. After the publication of the poster, even greater
violence and chaos spread throughout the countryside, resulting in the death of thousands of
“class enemies,” including President Liu Shaoqi, who died in 1969 after two years in prison, of
mistreatment, abuse, and failing health, which was further complicated by being denied
medication.
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Mao Pop Art:

LAST BANQUET
Laser prints, pages from the Red Book and acrylic on canvas
60 x 168 inch, 1989
Zhang Hongtu
http://www.momao.com/

After decades of artistic suppression, during the “era of Deng Xiaoping” there was a period of
relative liberalization and greater political and artistic freedom. In the early 1990’s, which
marked the centenary of Mao’s birthday, the personality cult resurfaced, albeit in a much more
openly satirical and “tongue-in-cheek” manner. During this period, known as Maore or “Mao
craze,” Mao’s image had been repurposed by a myriad of artists into sacrilegious pop art. In this
image, we see a pastiche of Leonardo da Vinci’s mural, The Last Supper. Instead of featuring
Jesus and the twelve disciples, however, we just see multiple Maos. One of them is holding a
Little Red Book, and instead of bread, they have bowls with chopsticks. The painting is made of
pages from the Little Red Book as well, which would have been unheard of and considered
traitorous and blasphemous during Mao’s reign. Notice the chamber pot and the bowl of rice
spilling over.
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Textbook Critique:
Based on the 10th grade global history textbook, World History: Patterns of Interaction, Mao
Zedong, and China in general, is mentioned quite briefly. The majority of the chapter on China is
focused on the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the PRC. Mao is first mentioned in the
context of Marx and the Communist Manifesto:
Published in 1848, The Communist Manifesto produced few short-term results. Though
widespread revolts shook Europe during 1848 and 1849, Europe’s leaders eventually put
down the uprisings. Only after the turn of the century did the fiery Marxist pamphlets
produce explosive results. In the 1900s, Marxism inspired revolutionaries such as Russia’s
Lenin, China’s Mao Zedong, Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh, and Cuba’s Fidel Castro. These
revolutionary leaders adapted Marx’s beliefs and arguments to their own specific situations
and needs. (p. 649)
I thought this little excerpt was interesting considering Mao is usually aligned with Stalin
rather than Lenin in terms of their execution of communism (no pun intended), but here Mao is
aligned with Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, and Castro ideologically. In the final sentence of the excerpt,
it is made clear that these different leaders applied communism differently in their respective
countries. I thought this was interesting because it seems to be distancing these leaders and their
practices from communism – maybe hinting that there is indeed some merit in Marxist
principles? I also thought it was interesting that Mao is defined as a “revolutionary,” that may
have a positive connotation, which reminds me of Crane Brinton’s, Anatomy of a Revolution and
his examination of the different actors found in revolutions.
The next section Mao is mentioned in is in a section about Stalin and the Soviet Union. In
this section, there is a table on totalitarianism:
Patterns of Change: Totalitarianism
Key Traits
Description
Dictatorship and
• Exercises absolute authority
One-Party Rule
• Dominates the government
Dynamic Leader
• Helps unite people toward meeting shared goals or realizing a
common vision
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•

Encourages people to devote their unconditional loyalty and
uncritical support to the regime
• Becomes a symbol of the government
Ideology (set of
• Justifies government actions
beliefs)
• Glorifies the aims of the state
State Control Over
• Business
All Sectors of Society • Family life
• Labor
• Youth groups
• Housing
• Religion
• Education
• The arts
State Control Over
• Demands total obedience to authority and personal sacrifice for
the Individual
the good of the state
• Denies basic liberties
Dependence on
• Relies on mass communication, such as radios, newsreels, and
Modern Technology
loudspeakers, to spread propaganda
• Builds up advanced military weapons
Organized Violence
• Uses force, such as police terror, to crush all opposition
• Targets certain groups, such as national minorities and political
opponents, as enemies
After this table, Mao is mentioned in the following excerpt:
Other totalitarian governments besides the Soviet Union emerged in the twentieth century. In
the 1920s and 1930s, two other European dictators – Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in
Italy – were shaping their visions of a totalitarian state. After Communists formed the
People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong used tactics similar to Stalin’s to establish
totalitarian control. The North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung ruled over a totalitarian
Communist state from 1948 to 1994. (p. 776)
Although in the later section on the Cultural Revolution, the personality cult isn’t explicitly
mentioned, the section, “State Control Over the Individual,” could perhaps be comparing it.
However, as we know now, it isn’t as clear cut as merely stating that the state “demands total
obedience to authority and personal sacrifice for the good of the state.” As analyzed by scholars
such as Melissa Schrift and Daniel Leese, the Mao cult was a largely grassroots phenomenon that
surpassed the original expectations of party leadership. Here we see the more common
association with other totalitarian leaders.
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The passage entirely devoted to the Cultural Revolution is very short – only two
paragraphs long. The passage bolds “Red Guards” as a key word, which is quite important, and
notes that the militia units comprised high school and college students. Perhaps it’d be
interesting if they had noted that even middle school students were quite active in other youth
leagues during the Cultural Revolution. The passage states: “The goal of the Cultural Revolution
was to establish a society of peasants and workers in which all were equal. The new hero was the
peasant who worked with his hands.” I thought this sentence was interesting since this is not how
I would necessarily describe the goal of the Cultural Revolution. In much of the scholarship
concerning the Cultural Revolution, it’s stated that the Cultural Revolution was both a political
endeavor for Mao to purge non-radical comrades, as well as an effort to drum up popular support
after the failures of the Great Leap Forward left many feeling disillusioned. The passage also
states, “The life of the mind – intellectual and artistic activity – was considered useless and
dangerous.” Although the Cultural Revolution was largely anti-intellectual, it was predominantly
ambitious in purging “capitalist roaders,” and persecuting class enemies.
However, in regards to the peasantry, they could have mentioned the “Down to the
Countryside Movement,” as a means to quell the violence of the youth. There is also no mention
of how many turned their backs on not only communism but also government in general, and the
events signaled a turning point for the Chinese Communist party that paved the way for China to
become the global power it is today. In this passage, they also fail to mention the results of the
Cultural Revolution. They could have cited how agricultural production stagnated, as well as the
“Lost Generation,” who suffered from years of not having any formal education, or how ideas
and different products spread throughout the countryside when Red Guards traveled around the
country.
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Interestingly enough, there is no mention of the Little Red Book, or Chairman Mao
badges, or anyone other than Mao – squarely placing all the blame on Mao’s shoulders. No
mention of the Gang of Four, or the Lin Biao incident, or Mao’s right-hand man, Liu Shaoqi.
There is no mention of struggle sessions, as well. The sentence, “Civil war seemed possible,” is
also pretty interesting considering many have defined the factionalism that ripped apart the
country during the time as a civil war. There’s also no mention of factionalism at all, or of the
infamous Tsinghua University incident.
Next to the section on the Cultural Revolution, there is a little excerpt titled “Daily Life: The
Cultural Revolution.” This little excerpt is an anecdote of what a man named Chihua Wen
witnessed when he was eight years old during the Cultural Revolution. Wen recounts his
neighbors’ home being ransacked by Red Guards, who sacked books and lit them on fire, and
insinuates that the couple and their child were killed by the Red Guards:
[The Red Guards] returned to the apartment and emerged carrying two heavy sacks. As they
raced off with the sacks in the back of the truck, Wen heard sounds of gagging. “No one ever
saw the couple or the child again,” he said. And Wen never forgot what he had seen.
Although I am not necessarily calling the authenticity of the passage into question, I think it
would be important to have included a citation – who conducted this interview? When was it
taken? Also, perhaps it would be interesting to have included an excerpt from a former Red
Guard instead.
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New Textbook Entry:
[Assuming section before is on the Great Leap Forward, the Sino-Soviet split, and the period of
moderation in economic policies]
After the catastrophic failures of the Great Leap Forward, resulting in the greatest
famine in history of the world, Mao Zedong stepped down as State Chairman of the People’s
Republic of China in 1959. Mao’s successor, Liu Shaoqi, and senior official Deng Xiaoping
began to move the government away from Mao’s radical policies. As a result, Mao lost his
prominence within the party.
This period of moderation troubled Mao, and fearing that he was losing power in the
Chinese Communist Party, Mao proclaimed the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution in May 1966. In the “May 16 Notification,” Mao called for an effort to purge the
remnants of bourgeois and feudal elements in both the Chinese Communist Party and in society.
The Cultural Revolution quickly escalated after the publication of Mao’s big-character
poster “Bombard the Headquarters” in August 5, 1967. Mao’s call for a purge within the
Chinese Communist Party instigated the Cultural Revolution by accusing people within the party
of being influenced by bourgeois elements, creating a “bourgeois dictatorship,” and subverting
the Chinese Revolution.
Millions of high school and college students responded to Mao’s call, forming militia
units called Red Guards. The radical youth rampaged throughout China, ransacking homes and
pillaging libraries, terrorizing civilians, torturing, beating, and executing people, especially
teachers, principals, intellectuals, and those with bourgeois backgrounds. Many “class enemies,”
including former President Liu Shaoqi and senior official Deng Xiaoping, were subjected to
humiliating and painful “struggle sessions” – a form of public criticism, humiliation, and torture
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to shape public opinion intended to persecute, sometimes execute, supposed class enemies who
were forced to confess to a series of crimes in the guise of “self-criticism.”
The young Red Guards were swept up into the personality cult of Chairman Mao, and
there was even violent rivalry between rival Red Guard groups who would fight over who was
more “red,” and more loyal and faithful to Chairman Mao. The factionalism between Red Guard
Groups, reached critical mass in the spring and summer of 1968 at Qinhua University in
Beijing, when a “war” broke out between factions where they bombed rivals’ dormitories,
burning several students alive.
While Chairman Mao initially supported the feverish violence enacted by the Red
Guards, when the nation was ultimately threatened with the prospect of anarchy, Mao suppressed
the widespread violence with the “Down the Countryside movement.” During the campaign, the
rampant violence and anarchy was eventually calmed down when thousands of students were
sent to the countryside in an effort to re-educate the intellectual youth through forced labor.
These students were deprived of a college education and taken away from their homes and
families, and as a result they became disillusioned and cynical, losing faith in both Mao’s
leadership and the Chinese Communist Party.
The period of violence ended with the death of Mao Zedong on September 9, 1976. Soon
after, the political group known as the Gang of Four was arrested, thus officially ending the
Cultural Revolution. This political faction consisted of Chairman Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and
her cronies, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen. The Gang of Four, threatened
by the power struggle concerning who would become Mao’s successor, further radicalized the
Cultural Revolution, censoring and defaming their enemies, such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhou
Enlai. Ultimately, they were arrested and put on trial, and were blamed for the excesses and
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atrocities that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Although Mao ushered in the revolution,
the Gang of Four were condemned as responsible, serving as scapegoats.
In an effort to put the Cultural Revolution in the past and move forward, the Chinese
Communist Party published the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our
Party since the Founding of the PRC.” The resolution was developed in the summer of 1981
by 4,000 party leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, who had been slandered and purged during the
Cultural Revolution. The party felt it was important to preserve Chairman Mao as a symbol of
both revolutionary and nationalist legacy, despite his failures. The resolution praised his success
in the revolutionary struggle against the Guomindang and economic successes at the beginning
of the creation of the PRC. However, the resolution criticized Mao extensively for the mistakes
during the Great Leap Forward; his disregard for Leninist principles by supporting the Maoist
cult; and the grave errors of the Cultural Revolution, which were condemned as largely his fault.
It would take decades for China to recover after the Cultural Revolution. The period of
intense political mayhem affected every aspect of Chinese society – millions were persecuted,
hurt and killed; schools and universities were shut down for students to criticize teachers;
spouses reported each other; children spied on their parents; and the state halted many of its
functions until 1969. During this tumultuous decade, Mao’s personality cult reached its climax,
and thousands wreaked chaos in his name, resulting in a civil war that ravaged the nation,
stunting the nation’s economic, educational, political, and artistic growth for years.
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